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Most DoD Zero Trust programs do not stall on conditional user access because the identity provider cannot talk to the application. They stall because the program has not defined which user and group attributes matter, where those attributes originate, how fresh they must be, and how they drive an authorization decision across mission systems, contractors, coalition users, and DDIL environments. That is a practical implementation problem, not a theory problem. Under ATO pressu

Most DoD Zero Trust programs do not stall on conditional user access because the identity provider cannot talk to the application. Under ATO pressure, with PPBE cycles already locked and mission owners protecting operational timelines, teams often connect IdPs first and clean up attribute governance later. DTM 25-003 does not support that sequence. Conditional access depends on trusted, federated, policy-usable attributes from the start.

Most civilian agencies still have a practical problem at the access layer: users are granted access based on static roles, but the risk around that user changes throughout the day. The user may move from a managed laptop to an unmanaged device. The session may originate from an unusual location. The endpoint may fall out of compliance. The account may show abnormal behavior. If the access decision does not change when the risk changes, the agency is not operating at OMB M-22-

Most civilian agencies do not fail conditional user access because the identity tool is weak. They fail because dynamic privilege management gets deployed as a configuration project instead of an operating discipline. The access rules go live, the integrations look good during implementation, and then nobody owns the recurring review process. Under OMB M-22-09 and the CISA Zero Trust Maturity Model, that gap matters.